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DISPARATE IMPACT AND EQUAL PROTECTION AFTER RICCI V. DESTEFANO 
 
BY MARCIA L. MCCORMICK
*
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This country has a long history of embracing expansive values and tolerating abuses of 
those values at the same time. These contradictory attitudes are evident in our approach to 
equality. We talk of equality as a core American value but tolerate significant levels of 
subordination of particular groups, often even groups that have historically been subordinated. 
We struggle with reconciling conflicts created by the pursuit of equality, pluralism, and liberty, 
and strike the balance among them differently at different times. In the current attempts to 
balance these interests, the Supreme Court is marking an increasingly formalist approach to the 
question of discrimination, an approach that poses a danger to legislation with a more substantive 
approach to equality. In this context, the Court is using the Constitution to limit Congress' power 
to prohibit discrimination. While the bulk of this trend has focused on limiting the kinds of race 
conscious actions state and local governments or the federal executive branch can take and the 
power Congress has to stop discrimination by states, the latest trend suggests that the Court may 
be focused on limiting the power of Congress to prohibit discrimination in private workplaces. 
 
The prohibitions against discrimination in the United States are found in multiple sources 
of law. The most well-known is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
principle that has been embodied in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as well. 
Additionally, several federal statutes prohibit discrimination in employment,
1
 housing,
2
 public 
accommodations,
3
 and education.
4
 Most states have constitutional and statutory prohibitions, as 
well. Over time, the content of the antidiscrimination norm has been fleshed out in court 
decisions, legislative debates, and in the media somewhat sporadically. The commitment to 
equality is very present in the public consciousness
5
 and yet still contested enough that there are 
gaps in consensus on the content of the norm. 
  
Part of the reason for this lack of consensus is that the issue of discrimination in 
employment has not been in the forefront of public debate the way it had been in earlier years. 
Employment discrimination was one of the main focuses of the Civil Rights Movement in the 
1960s, which led to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the employment title of which is 
popularly known as Title VII. Early cases in the 1970s concerning that statute focused on what 
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1
 See e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). 
2
 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006). 
3
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2006). 
4
 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (2006). 
5
 As a proxy for the level of public interest surrounding this issue, I used a search of the case name, Ricci v. 
DeStefano, the subject of this article, in print news sources held in the LexisNexis database over 2008 and 2009. 
That search revealed 1174 stories. The search for the term “employment discrimination” yielded about 1000 stories 
in each month of 2008, and over 1500 stories for each month in the early part of 2009. In the last three months of 
2009, the news stories were back down to about 900 per month. 
practices constituted discrimination on the basis of race.
6
 Likewise, employment discrimination 
was part of the central focus of the second wave of the feminist movement. Interspersed with the 
wave of cases concerning race discrimination in the 1970s were a number of cases dealing with 
discrimination on the basis of sex.
7
 In a wave following those cases, litigation under the Equal 
Protection Clause in the 1980s addressed the use of affirmative action to benefit black people 
and whether that was permissible or itself discrimination against white people.
8
 During that same 
time, sex discrimination under Title VII continued to be litigated.
9
 Since then, most cases and 
legislation involving employment discrimination have concerned the more technical and 
procedural aspects of litigating the issue.
10
  
 
And while there had been significant litigation concerning race and sex in the education 
context,
11
 the content of the norm prohibiting discrimination in employment had not been 
addressed by the Supreme Court in many years. At the end of its 2008 term, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its first decision in decades addressing the content of the norm against 
race discrimination in employment in Ricci v. DeStefano.
12
 The Court took a decidedly formalist 
turn, instituting a color-blind standard to define discrimination under Title VII at least in some 
circumstances.
13
 In a similar move in the 2010 term, the Court considered a case ostensibly about 
the requirements for class actions that may have far-reaching effects on the content of the norm 
against sex discrimination in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.
14
 
 
At issue in Ricci was whether a city government’s rejection of promotional test results 
that caused a disparate impact on firefighters of color was disparate treatment, and if so, whether 
the city could defend its actions on the grounds that it was avoiding liability for the disparate 
impact.
15
 The majority, dissent, and one concurring opinion debated those issues, but in the mix 
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 E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  
7
 See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that classifications on the basis of sex warranted 
intermediate scrutiny); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down laws that kept women off of juries 
on the basis of sex); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (striking down a law requiring 
mandatory unpaid maternity leave as a violation of the Due Process Clause); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 
U.S. 188 (1974) (rejecting pay disparities on the basis of sex which were based on the history of paying women less 
than their male counterparts); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (stating that sex 
should be considered a suspect class); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a state law that gave men 
automatic preference to be executors of estates as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
8
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
9
 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (ruling that victims of sexual harassment could bring 
claims even where they did not suffer physical or serious psychological injury); Johnson v. Santa Clara Cnty., 480 
U.S. 616 (1987) (approving affirmative action for women); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) 
(recognizing that hostile work environment sex discrimination violated Title VII); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 
U.S. 69 (1984) (ruling that law firms may not discriminate on the basis of sex in promoting lawyers to partnership 
positions). 
10
 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Soc'y v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 
490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
11
 See e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
12
 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
13
 See id. at 2673-74. 
14
 See generally Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
15
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-74. 
was a concurrence by Justice Scalia, focused on a separate issue. Because the employer was a 
government, the constitution applied to its actions, and the plaintiffs had alleged that the city’s 
decision violated the Equal Protection clause.
16
 The majority held that the decision violated Title 
VII and so did not address the equal protection claim. Justice Scalia, however, would have.
17
 
 
Justice Scalia posited that Title VII’s disparate impact provisions might violate the equal 
protection guarantee that is part of the Fifth Amendment.
18
 His logic was this: by prohibiting 
disparate impact discrimination, Congress required private employers to take race, and 
presumably the other statuses protected, into account in order to be motivated to act in a 
particular way because of that status; taking an action because of someone’s race would likely be 
a violation of equal protection if done by Congress directly; because Congress could not 
discriminate this way, the Fifth Amendment bars it from passing a statute that requires 
discrimination by private parties.
19
 In Wal-Mart, the Court might have had to confront the 
constitutionality of the disparate impact theory in the context of sex discrimination because the 
employer action in that case was alleged to have been either disparate treatment or disparate 
impact.
20
 Justice Scalia even wrote the opinion. However, the Court ignored the disparate impact 
issue entirely, and thus the constitutional issue, instead focusing only on whether the conduct 
alleged would be disparate treatment.
21
  
 
As Professor Richard Primus noted in his article, Equal Protection and Disparate 
Impact: Round Three, the constitutional issues surrounding the disparate impact theory of 
discrimination have evolved significantly over time.
22
 First the question was whether the 
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee embodied disparate impact. Most people assumed yes, 
but the Supreme Court said no in 1976 in Washington v. Davis.
23
 Second, the source of 
Congress’ power to prohibit disparate impact discrimination was called into question with the so-
called federalism revolution.
24
 Only if it was within Congress’ power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could disparate impact legislation be applied to the states consistent with 
the Eleventh Amendment.
25
 The question in Ricci goes one step further: to the extent that the 
prohibition on disparate impact discrimination requires employers to take race conscious action, 
can Congress enact it consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process? 
 
 This paper argues that the answer is "yes" after the cases of the federalism revolution and 
that Congress' power comes from the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments. However the 
greatest dangers to disparate impact are the passage of time since the civil rights movement, the 
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 See id. at 2664, 2672, 2681. 
17
 Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
18
 Id. at 2. 
19
 Id. at 2682-83. 
20
 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2548 
21
 See id. at 2552-57. 
22
 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 494-95 
(2003). 
23
 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
24
 See Primus, supra note 22, at 494; see also Marcia L. McCormick, Solving the Mystery of How Ex Parte Young 
Escaped the Federalism Revolution, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 909 (2009) (describing the so-called federalism revolution 
and its impact on both civil rights legislation and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence). 
25
 See Marcia L. McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The Eleventh Amendment's Illogical Impact on Congress' 
Power, 37 IND. L. REV. 354, 354-69 (2004). 
lack of consensus that disparate impact is discrimination, and the worldview by several of the 
Justices that discrimination against people of color and women is a thing of the past. In Part II, 
this paper will describe the Ricci case with particular focus on Justice Scalia's concurrence. Part 
III lays out the Court's jurisprudence on the federalism revolution and explains how that 
jurisprudence may apply to this question. Finally, Part IV briefly explores the dangers to 
disparate impact that nonetheless remain. 
 
II. THE RICCI DECISION 
A. Background 
The City of New Haven, Connecticut used a set of tests to promote firefighters to the 
ranks of lieutenant and captain.
26
 The full process was this: the city would create a list of 
qualified applicants, ranked in order; when lieutenant or captain positions became available, 
promotions would be granted based on that list; the City was required to pick the person to be 
promoted from the top three on that list; and the list would be valid for two years, after which 
time a new eligibility list would have to be created.
27
 The list was created through an 
examination process, which included both a written and an oral examination, designed by a 
professional testing company.
28
 Sixty percent of the final score was determined by the written 
test score and forty percent by the oral test score.
29
 The applicants who scored a certain passing 
minimum were put on the list in rank order from highest to lowest score.
30
  
 
After the tests were administered and the applicants for promotion ranked, City leaders 
noticed that the highest scores were held by white applicants and the lowest held by black and 
Latino applicants at a rate disproportionate to their numbers in the applicant pool.
31
 Sixty-four 
percent of the white applicants who took the test for promotion to captain passed, while just 
under thirty-eight percent of black and Hispanic applicants passed.
32
  
 
The City could have asked the testing company for a technical report to analyze the 
validity of the test – how well it predicted performance in the jobs it was required for – but did 
not and instead simply interviewed the test’s designer and then held several days of hearings to 
determine whether the list should be used.
33
 At those hearings, a number of witnesses testified, 
some in favor of using the list,
34
 some taking no position on using it,
35
 and some against using 
                                                 
26
 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009). 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. at 2665-66. 
29
 Id. at 2665. 
30
 Id.  
31
 Id. at 2666. 
32
 Id.. 
33
 Id. at 2666-71. 
34
 The test’s designer told the City leaders that the test was valid, that any disparity was caused by external factors, 
and that the result was not significantly different from the City’s prior promotional examinations. Id. at 2666, 2668. 
Several promotional candidates testified that the test was fair and that they had worked very hard. Id. at 2667. 
Counsel for the applicants who became plaintiffs in the eventual suit argued that the City should certify the results. 
Id. A retired fire captain from another state testified that the material tested was relevant to the jobs and that the 
study materials were less extensive than for other departments. Id. at 2669. 
35
 One of the testing experts stated that the test was “reasonably good” and that the City ought to certify the test but 
change the process in the future. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2669.  Neither the retired fire captain nor the testing expert 
called by the City gave any opinion on whether the test should be certified. Id. 
it.
36
 Several witnesses, including the test’s designer, testified that they believed the test was fair 
overall,
37
 some testified about racial disparities in written tests generally,
38
 and some testified 
about alternative ways to measure qualifications, from weighing the portions of the test 
differently to entirely different processes.
39
 At the end of the hearings, the members of the City’s 
Civil Service Board, the body that had to approve the list, split on whether to use the test results, 
and because there was not a majority in favor of using those results – the vote was tied – the list 
was discarded.
40
  
 
Several white and one Hispanic firefighter sued the City in federal court, arguing that 
discarding the test results discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.
41
 In the proceedings before the district court, the City’s main defense was that City leaders 
had not discarded the results because of the race of the plaintiffs, but had instead discarded the 
results to avoid liability for discriminating against black and Hispanic applicants, upon whom the 
test had had a disparate impact.
42
 The firefighters and the City filed motions for summary 
judgment, both asserting that the material facts were not in dispute and that each respectively 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
43
 
 
The district court granted the City’s motion.44 The district court held that as a matter of 
law, the “motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact 
. . . does not . . . constitute discriminatory intent,”45 which meant that the City had not violated 
Title VII. The court further held that such a decision was not based on race within the meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause because all of the test results were discarded and all races were 
treated the same – members of all races had to start the process over.46 The firefighters appealed, 
and the intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
47
 The firefighters 
                                                 
36
 Some firefighters testified that the test was not fair: questions were outdated or irrelevant to the job and the 
materials too extensive and expensive. Id. at 2667.  One firefighter from a neighboring town called the test 
inherently unfair, and another suggested a validation study was necessary. Id. 
37
 Id. at 2667 (firefighters testifying that the test was fair); id. at 2668 (test creator stating that the test was neutral 
but expressing surprise at the level of disparity). But see Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2667 (firefighters testifying that the 
questions were outdated or not relevant to the City, and that the study materials were too expensive and long; that 
the test was “inherently unfair”; that the results should be adjusted). 
38
 Id. at 2667 (testifying about a neighboring city’s practices); id. at 2669 (three experts testifying that written tests 
often have some level of disparity based on race). 
39
 A competitor to the company that designed the test used testified that the City could have used “assessment 
centers” in which applicants face realistic scenarios to which they must respond just as they would in the field. Id. at 
2669. A firefighter from a neighboring town suggested adjusting the ratios or otherwise adjusting the final scores in 
some way to negate the effects of the disparity. Id. at 2667. 
40
 Id. at 2671. 
41
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 163 (D. Conn. 2006), rev.d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).  
45
 Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160. 
46
 Id. at 161. 
47
 Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The court of appeals considered sua sponte 
whether to rehear the case en banc, and voted seven to six to deny that rehearing. Judges Calabresi, Katzmann, and 
B.D. Parker filed opinions concurring in the denial of rehearing. Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes dissented 
from that decision.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (Calabresi, J., concurring); id. at 89 
sought review of the decision by the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the case
48
 and 
issued its decision at the end of the term.
49
 
 
B. The Decision 
 
The Supreme Court, in a five to four opinion written by Justice Kennedy, reversed the 
lower court’s entry of summary judgment for the city, holding that the decision to discard the test 
results was based on the race of the successful candidates, and this was intentional discrimination 
that would violate Title VII unless the City had a substantial basis in evidence to believe that the 
promotional process created a disparate impact on the black and Hispanic firefighters that would 
violate Title VII.
50
 The Court further held that the City lacked this substantial basis in evidence.
51
 
Because it had reversed the lower court on statutory grounds, the Court declined to analyze the 
equal protection issue.
52
 Justices Scalia
53
 and Alito
54
 wrote separate concurrences, and Justice 
Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion.
55
 
 
Before analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in depth, it is necessary to lay out the 
analytical framework for Title VII in a little bit more detail. Title VII provides in part that 
  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin;
56
   
 
This provision is generally thought to prohibit disparate treatment, also called intentional 
discrimination.
57
 To prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that an employer has treated 
that plaintiff less favorably than it otherwise would have because of the plaintiff’s protected 
status, in a case like Ricci, because of the plaintiff’s race.58 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 90 (Parker, J., concurring); id. at 92 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at 93 (Cabranes, J., 
dissenting).   
48
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009). 
49
 Id. at 2658. 
50
 Id. at 2673-76.  
51
 Id. at 2678-81. 
52
 Id. at 2672, 2681. 
53
 Id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
54
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Alito, J., concurring). 
55
 Id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
56
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Remedies for disparate treatment include reinstatement, back pay, other 
equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1988, 2000e-5(g) 
(2006). 
57
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672. 
58
 Id.; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-91 (1988) (holding that discriminatory intent 
can be inferred from, in part, an overly subjective promotions process); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135-
36 (1976) (holding that discriminating against pregnancy was not discrimination “based upon gender as such”). 
Title VII also prohibits disparate impact discrimination, or discrimination in effects.
59
 
When a plaintiff proves that an employer’s neutral practice has a disproportionate negative effect 
on the plaintiff’s protected group, an employer can defend that neutral practice by demonstrating 
that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.”60 The employer will nonetheless be liable if the plaintiff shows that the employer 
refuses to adopt an available alternative practice that has less impact and still serves the 
employer’s legitimate needs.61 
 
1. The Majority Opinion: Avoiding Disparate Impact is Disparate Treatment 
 
 The Court in Ricci held that these two separate prohibitions conflicted in this situation, 
essentially finding that a decision to act because a practice may cause a racially disparate impact 
is a decision made on the basis of race.
62
 In the Court’s words, “[t]he City rejected the test results 
because the higher scoring candidates were white.”63 Considering the race-based effects of the 
testing and rejecting the test on that ground was taking an adverse action because of an 
individual's race. 
 
The second step in the Court’s analysis attempted to harmonize the conflict this premise 
set up. The Court held that good faith fear of a disparate impact lawsuit cannot be enough to 
justify acting because of an individual's race.
64
 That would allow employers to avoid liability for 
racially motivated actions “at the slightest hint” of a disparate impact and to maintain some sort 
of racial quota or balance.
65
 
 
To avoid this result, the Court looked to affirmative action cases under the Equal 
Protection Clause for an analogy, reasoning that affirmative action created the same kind of 
conflict in equal protection doctrine that this collision of disparate impact and disparate treatment 
created.
66
 Under the Equal Protection Clause, a government employer can engage in race-based 
decisions like minority set-asides where there is a strong basis in evidence that such a decision is 
warranted to remedy past discrimination by that government employer.
67
 The Court stated that 
such a standard was appropriate to balance the competing interests at stake.
68
 That standard 
                                                 
59
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(2)(a)(2), (k) (2006); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971). The text 
of Title VII as it was originally enacted embodies disparate impact, although the Court in Griggs did not rely on that 
language for its opinion, and the majority in Ricci did not analyze that language. The operative language is: 
 “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .” 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(2). Remedies for disparate impact include reinstatement, back pay, other equitable relief, 
and attorneys’ fees, but not compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1988, 2000e-5(g) (2006). 
60
 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
61
 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
62
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674 (2009). 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. at 2675. 
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 
(1986). 
68
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675-76. 
 gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions, 
allowing violations of one in the name of compliance with the other only in 
certain, narrow circumstances. The standard leaves ample room for employers' 
voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme and to 
Congress's efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination. . . . . And the standard 
appropriately constrains employers' discretion in making race-based decisions: It 
limits that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence of 
disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act 
only when there is a provable, actual violation.
69
 
 
The Court limited the applicability of its holding to a situation like the one in Ricci, 
stating that it would apply only after a promotional or hiring process has been established and 
employers have told applicants the selection criteria.
70
 At that point, the employer “may not then 
invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee's legitimate expectation not to be judged on 
the basis of race.”71 By implication then, a race conscious decision related to a hiring or 
promotional practice is only discrimination when it has been applied to specific people who have 
a contrary expectation interest in that process. While the process is being developed, no specific 
people have any particular expectations about that process, and no actual person is being judged 
on his or her race. 
 
Having set forth the test, the Court applied it to the evidence submitted to the district 
court. The Court found that the City had demonstrated that the racial disparate impact caused by 
the test was significant. The pass rates for the applicants of color were about half the pass rate for 
the white applicants.
72
 This rate differential fell well below the level the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has said will demonstrate a disparate impact.
73
 The EEOC has 
developed regulations to define what kinds of evidence can show that the negative impact of a 
practice on a protected group is severe enough to meet the plaintiff’s burden. The regulations 
state that  
 
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths 
(4⁄5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will 
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse 
impact.
74
 
 
Even if the pass rates alone had not demonstrated a significant disparate impact, the 
ranking and selection process would have. For example, if the list were used, the City would not 
have been able to consider any black applicant for a then-vacant lieutenant or captain position.
75
 
 
                                                 
69
 Id. at 2676. 
70
 Id. at 2677. 
71
 Id.   
72
 Id. at 2678. 
73
 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008) and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995-96 n.3 
(1988) (plurality opinion)). 
74
 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2011). 
75
 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678. 
 Given the severity of this negative impact on applicants of color, the Court acknowledged 
that the City was required to look closely at its examination process.
76
 However that hard look, in 
the Court's view, did not provide enough evidence that the City would be unable to successfully 
defend the test because the test was not job related, or that the plaintiffs would be able to show 
that there were alternative processes that would cause less impact and still meet the City’s 
legitimate goals.
77
 The Court found that there was “no genuine dispute that the examinations 
were job-related and consistent with business necessity,” citing the care the test’s designer had 
taken to design the tests and the statements of various witnesses to the hearings that the tests 
were generally good.
78
 Additionally, the fact that the City had not requested the validation study 
suggested to the Court that the City was not actually concerned that the tests were not job related 
and consistent with business necessity.
79
 On the issue of other alternative processes, the Court 
rejected them as not viable either because they were not really available or proven to meet the 
City’s legitimate business needs.80 
 
 As its last step, the Court considered what action to take on the district court’s decision. It 
decided to not just reverse the grant of judgment in favor of the City, but to enter summary 
judgment in favor of the firefighters.
81
 The Court’s reasoning in a nutshell is this: 
 
The record in this litigation documents a process that, at the outset, had the 
potential to produce a testing procedure that was true to the promise of Title VII: 
No individual should face workplace discrimination based on race. Respondents 
thought about promotion qualifications and relevant experience in neutral ways. 
They were careful to ensure broad racial participation in the design of the test 
itself and its administration. As we have discussed at length, the process was open 
and fair. 
 
The problem, of course, is that after the tests were completed, the raw racial 
results became the predominant rationale for the City's refusal to certify the 
results. The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of the 
candidates who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City had 
established for the promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for 
months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and thus the injury caused 
by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the 
more severe. Confronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test 
results – and threats of a lawsuit either way – the City was required to make a 
difficult inquiry. But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparate-
impact violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely 
on the racial disparity in the results.
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 In addition to the majority opinion, there was a dissenting opinion and two concurring 
opinions. Because the dissent responds to the majority, and one of the concurrences responds to 
issues raised only by the dissent, I will describe the dissent first, and then the responding 
concurrence. I will end this section with a description of Justice Scalia's concurrence.  
 
2. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent approached the problem from a longer view, providing greater 
context for the City’s action. She traced the history of discrimination by the City in its fire 
department and the way that current practices seemed to freeze that prior discrimination. The 
population of the City is nearly sixty percent black and Hispanic, and yet the leadership of its fire 
department is primarily white.
83
 This country, and the City of New Haven, have a long history of 
discrimination in firefighting in particular, caused by a combination of racism and a failure by 
departments to use merit-based employment practices.
84
 The City of New Haven had, in fact, 
been sued for race discrimination within the fire department.
85
 And while at the time of the list's 
generation people of color were much better represented in the lower ranks of firefighter than 
they historically had been, in the senior ranks, only nine percent of officers were black and nine 
percent Hispanic.
86
 Furthermore, the City was not limited to using a written test under civil 
service rules, but could have chosen from a variety of testing methods, including practical 
examinations like the assessment center model.
87
 The City used the written and oral test only 
because that is what it had been doing for two decades under its contract with the firefighters’ 
union and asked the testing company only to create that kind of test.
88
 
 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent viewed additional facts from the City’s hearings as relevant. 
She noted that the city’s counsel emphasized that the statistical disparity alone did not create 
disparate impact liability for the City.
89
 Testimony indicated that firefighters of color had 
significantly greater obstacles in getting copies of the study materials than had the white 
firefighters.
90
 Additionally, a firefighter from a nearby city testified that his city had changed the 
weights given the oral and written portions of the exam because the oral portion was more job 
related: it was able to address realistic scenarios that officers encounter.
91
 This change also 
increased the representation of firefighters of color in leadership positions significantly.
92
 
Furthermore, the testimony from the testing experts casts doubt on the validity of a written exam 
to test performance-type positions.
93
 And finally, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the decision 
not to use the list was made by the Civil Service Board and that the two members who voted not 
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to use the list stated that they were concerned that the process used to create it was flawed.
94
 All 
of these facts demonstrated significant evidence that the process used would not satisfy the 
business necessity test and that there were alternatives which would serve the City’s needs at 
least as well if not better that would not have the same impact.
95
 
 
As a legal matter, the dissent focused on the importance of the disparate impact theory of 
discrimination to Title VII, faulting the majority for suggesting that the theory, and Congress’ 
focus on the consequences of employers’ conduct, not simply motivation for that conduct, was 
not part of that statute’s original, foundational prohibition.96 The dissent further noted that the 
disparate impact theory is present in the original statutory language, which prohibits any system 
that limits or classifies employees or applicants in a way that would tend to deprive those people 
of employment opportunities or other otherwise adversely affect their status.
97
 Additional 
language in the statute prohibited the use of professionally developed ability tests if those tests' 
results were used to discriminate.
98
 Disparate impact is designed to ensure that employers 
demonstrate that hiring and promotional processes bear a “manifest relationship” to the job they 
are used for.
99
  
 
Additionally, the dissent disagreed that acting to avoid a disparate impact could be 
viewed as disparate treatment consistent with Congress’ design of Title VII.100  
 
Observance of Title VII's disparate-impact provision, in contrast [to the cases the 
Court draws the strong basis in evidence test from], calls for no racial preference, 
absolute or otherwise. The very purpose of the provision is to ensure that 
individuals are hired and promoted based on qualifications manifestly necessary 
to successful performance of the job in question, qualifications that do not screen 
out members of any race.
101
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The test that Justice Ginsburg would have adopted would have been that an employer 
who discards a promotional or hiring process when the disproportionate racial impact of that 
process becomes evident violates Title VII only if the employer lacks good cause to believe the 
process would not withstand scrutiny for business necessity.
103
 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, 
there was no evidence to justify the sixty/forty percent ratio for the test scores as at all predictive 
of performance in the job.
104
 
 
Justice Ginsburg faulted the majority for not considering the definition of disparate 
treatment as it has been developed through Title VII’s affirmative action cases. The Court had 
previously held that voluntary consideration of the protected status of a person benefitted by such 
a plan simply was not discrimination against those not benefitted.
105
 In fact, voluntary 
affirmative action plans that consider a protected status as one factor among others help 
“‘eliminate[e] the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace,’” which is the ultimate goal of 
Title VII.
106
  
 
Justice Ginsburg also warned that the majority’s holding would seriously frustrate 
employer efforts to voluntarily comply with Title VII. The strong basis in evidence test, at least 
in the stringent form used by the majority, seemed indistinguishable from requiring an employer 
to prove an actual disparate impact violation against itself before it could act to prevent a 
disparate impact.
107
 And related to that, she criticized the majority for entering judgment for the 
plaintiffs, not allowing the City the chance to provide evidence to meet this newly defined 
standard.
108
 In fact, because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had regulations 
that allow employers even to take affirmative action, not simply refrain from acting, when faced 
with facts suggesting an actual or potential adverse impact, the City might have been able to 
avail itself of an affirmative defense in Title VII that provides a safe harbor to employers who 
have complied with EEOC regulations.
109
 
 
3. Justice Alito’s Concurrence: A Response to Justice Ginsburg 
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 Justice Alito’s concurrence focused primarily on the factual record developed before the 
district court. In disparate treatment cases, when an employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason 
for its actions, the evaluating court must decide first whether that reason was really 
nondiscriminatory – which the majority in this case analyzed – and if it was, must then decide 
whether that reason was the real reason or instead a pretext for discrimination. Justice Alito’s 
concurrence made that analysis. 
 
 In Justice Alito’s view, a reasonable jury could find that the City was motivated by a 
desire to placate a politically motivated racial constituency.
110
 One of the most outspoken people 
at the City’s meetings was an African American minister, who was a leader in the community 
and a political supporter of the mayor.
111
 Justice Alito catalogued evidence of this minister’s 
exhortations at the meeting and influence on the mayor and the mayor’s staff.112 Justice Alito 
also listed facts that could suggest the mayor’s staff and city attorney tailored the information 
presented to the City’s Civil Service Board to persuade the members to discard the test results, 
and that the mayor made known that he would reject the Board’s findings if they certified the 
list.
113
 
 
In short, 
 
Almost as soon as the City disclosed the racial makeup of the list of firefighters 
who scored the highest on the exam, the City administration was lobbied by an 
influential community leader to scrap the test results, and the City administration 
decided on that course of action before making any real assessment of the 
possibility of a disparate-impact violation. To achieve that end, the City 
administration concealed its internal decision but worked – as things turned out, 
successfully – to persuade the CSB that acceptance of the test results would be 
illegal and would expose the City to disparate-impact liability. But in the event 
that the CSB was not persuaded, the Mayor, wielding ultimate decisionmaking 
authority, was prepared to overrule the CSB immediately. Taking this view of the 
evidence, a reasonable jury could easily find that the City's real reason for 
scrapping the test results was not a concern about violating the disparate-impact 
provision of Title VII but a simple desire to please a politically important racial 
constituency.
114
 
 
This desire to please a politically important racial constituency played out in the form of 
a motive to discard the results because of the race of the successful candidates, concluded Justice 
Alito.
115
 
 
4. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence: The Problem with Disparate Impact 
 
                                                 
110
 Id. at 2683-84 (Alito, J., concurring).  
111
 See id. at 2684-85. 
112
 Id. at 2684-86. 
113
 Id. at 2686-87. 
114
 Id. at 2687-88. 
115
 Id. at 2688. 
 Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but cautioned that he believed the Court would 
have to decide one day whether the disparate impact provisions of Title VII violate equal 
protection.
116
 He agreed with the majority that an employer engages in disparate treatment when 
it evaluates the racial results of a promotional or hiring process and makes decisions based on 
those outcomes, and stated further that Congress cannot require employers to do this consistent 
with the equal protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.
117
 In other words, 
Congress cannot require employers to discriminate, and avoiding a disparate impact is 
discrimination.  
 
 And Justice Scalia seemed to find no difference caused by the timing of the employer’s 
action. To him, the design of a system that avoids a disparate impact on a protected group is 
discrimination whether or not anyone has expectations in the use of the process yet.
118
 He opined 
that disparate impact liability might be constitutional if the disparate impact theory was 
conceived of only as a means to get at intentional discrimination that is simply too hard to prove 
using the usual models.
119
 However, in order to make the theory serve even that very limited 
purpose, Justice Scalia thought that employers would need some kind of affirmative defense of 
good faith or good faith plus hiring standards that are reasonable.
120
 
 
 Justice Scalia's view is narrower than the Court's jurisprudence in other areas would 
suggest. The next section of this paper explores some of that in the context of the Court's recent 
federalism jurisprudence. The Court has suggested in the past that disparate impact is a 
reasonable prophylactic rule to enforce the prohibition on intentional race discrimination. It 
should find the same thing to be true for sex discrimination, although there are dangers to the 
viability of the disparate impact theory for both groups. 
 
III. The Federalism Revolution and the Reconstruction Amendments 
 
 Immediately after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, the statute was challenged 
on the grounds that Congress could not require private parties to stop discriminating. The 
challengers focused on the public accommodations provisions and claimed that the statute 
exceeded Congress's commerce clause power and deprived it of liberty and property without due 
process.
121
 
 
 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court held that Congress could 
prohibit private race discrimination at least by businesses that affect interstate commerce under 
the Commerce Clause.
122
 The Court also rejected Fifth Amendment and Thirteenth Amendment 
challenges. The Fifth Amendment argument was that the hotel was deprived of property without 
due process of law or suffered a taking because it could not refuse the customers it wished to.
123
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The Thirteenth Amendment challenge was that the law forced the hotel into involuntary 
servitude by forcing it to serve customers it didn't wish to.
124
 The Court found the latter argument 
particularly frivolous since the law was designed to remove the badges and incidents of 
slavery.
125
  
 
After Heart of Atlanta Motel, Congress's power to enact Title VII was mostly settled.  
The bigger question was whether state action that was not intended to be discriminatory but 
which had discriminatory effects was prohibited by the Equal Protection clause. For a number of 
years, it was fairly widely believed that disparate impact was prohibited by the Equal Protection 
Clause.
126
 The Supreme Court rejected that proposition in Washington v. Davis in 1976.
127
 There 
was no hint at that time that prohibiting discriminatory effects would pose a constitutional 
problem, and in fact, the Court seemingly approved of such a rule, but thought Congress should 
be the body to create it: "[E]xtension of the [disparate impact] rule beyond those areas where it is 
already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await 
legislative prescription."
128
 
 
Then the focus of litigation shifted during the late 1980s and 1990s to affirmative action, 
and the Court's decisions in that area, taking equal protection doctrine into new formalist 
territory, created the tension that Richard Primus highlighted in his 2003 article, Equal 
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, and Justice Scalia latched onto in his 
concurrence in Ricci. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a plurality of the Court stated 
that any consideration of race, even for benign reasons to benefit groups historically 
discriminated against, was subject to the same level of strict scrutiny as considerations that 
would harm groups historically discriminated against.
129
 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
the Court struck down an affirmative action plan the city was requiring its contractors to agree 
to, a plan that involved minority set-asides for subcontractors, and a majority of justices finally 
agreed that strict scrutiny should apply.
130
 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held 
that the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee should be made identical to the 
Fourteenth Amendment's.
131
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 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)). 
Thus began the shift to impose limits on Congress' power to prohibit or remedy 
discrimination, a shift that gained new life when the Eleventh Amendment was reinvigorated in 
1996 in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.
132
 The story of the Eleventh amendment begins with 
Chisholm v. Georgia,
133
 in which the Supreme Court allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue 
the State of Georgia for money damages in federal court.
134
 The Court found federal jurisdiction 
over the action under the plain language of Article III, which gives the federal courts jurisdiction 
over "[c]ontroversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . ."
135
 Almost 
immediately, the Eleventh Amendment was adopted.
136
 The plain language of the Eleventh 
Amendment prohibits suits "in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or . . . of any Foreign State."
137
 In Hans v. Louisiana, 
the Court read more into that language, holding that it prohibited suits in federal courts not only 
by citizens of foreign states but also by a citizen against his or her own state.
138
 Thus interpreted, 
the Eleventh Amendment prohibited all actions by private parties brought in federal court both 
against states as parties of record and state officials in their official capacities where the state 
would be the real party in interest unless the states have consented to those suits or Congress has 
validly abrogated their immunity.  
 
 In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to apply to state and local government 
employers,
139
 and shortly after that amendment, states challenged that as exceeding Congress' 
power. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that Congress could validly abrogate state 
immunity from suit under the Fourteenth Amendment and the other reconstruction amendments 
because they shifted power from the states to Congress.
140
 The Court also concluded that 
Congress had exercised its power under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting Title VII, but it 
did not analyze whether Title VII was valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation because the 
parties did not dispute it.
141
 
 
In Seminole Tribe, the Court added new import to the question of Congress' power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment when it held that Congress could not abrogate state Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause, but instead could only do so under its 
Fourteenth Amendment powers.
142
 The Court's reasoning went like this. Using a historical 
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analysis, the Court found that state immunity from suit in federal court was part of the 
constitutional design and that states did not give up this immunity by ratifying the 
Constitution.
143
 The Fourteenth Amendment altered that arrangement, however, shifting power 
from the states to the federal government, and thus amending both Article III and the Eleventh 
Amendment to the extent they were inconsistent.
144
 
 
Thus, Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment became more vital, and the 
scope of Congress's enforcement power was fleshed out in a string of cases challenging laws that 
purported to abrogate state immunity. The line of cases limiting Congress' power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment began the year after the Seminole Tribe decision with City of Boerne v. 
Flores,
145
 which assessed whether Congress could statutorily expand rights founded in the 
Constitution.
146
  In City of Boerne, the statute at issue was the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA),
147
 a congressional attempt to change the law on the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise clause, enacted after an unpopular Supreme Court decision, Employment Division v. 
Smith.
148
  In Smith, the Court had held that state statutes of general applicability that did not 
purposefully discriminate against religious observance but only incidentally affected religious 
practices would be subject to rational basis scrutiny.
149
  Public reaction to the seeming change in 
the law was strong; Congress passed the RFRA in direct response.
150
  The RFRA provided that 
any substantial burden on religion by a neutral law would be suspect, and it required legislators 
to show that the statute was the least restrictive means to advance a compelling governmental 
interest.
151
  Congress clearly stated that the RFRA was an attempt to “restore” the pre-Smith law 
on the Free Exercise Clause; thus, it was a direct challenge to the Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution.
152
  In City of Boerne, the Court held that Congress could not use the Fourteenth 
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Id. § 2000bb(b). Thus, Congress directly challenged the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. 
Amendment to expand rights beyond what the Court had declared them to be, nor could it create 
remedies out of proportion to a demonstrated record of Fourteenth Amendment violations.
153
 
 
After City of Boerne, the Court continued its trend of invalidating legislation enacted 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
and Expense Board v. College Savings Bank
154
 and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board,
155
 the Court held that the Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act
156
 and the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
157
 were not 
valid enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment.
158
  It also held that two civil rights laws 
exceeded Congress’ power under Section 5:  In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,159 the Court 
held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
160
 was not congruent and proportional to 
any documented pattern of constitutional violations by states;
161
 the Court held the same thing 
for Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
162
 in Board of Trustees v. Garrett.
163
 
 
In both of the civil rights cases, the Court began its analyses by looking to what the 
constitutional test was for discrimination on the basis of the statutes’ protected statuses.164  
Because both age and disability classifications received rational-basis review,
165
 that is, decisions 
based on age and disability were presumptively valid, the statutes, which arguably made such 
decisions presumptively invalid, were not congruent to the Fourteenth Amendment.
166
  Without a 
record of constitutional violations by the states, any remedy for those decisions was out of 
proportion to any constitutional harm.
167
 
 
The significance of the Court’s use of the constitutional test as the starting point and the 
importance of characterizing the statute’s function became clear in Nevada Department of 
Human Services v. Hibbs.
168
  In Hibbs, the Court found the Family Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA)
169
 to be within Congress’ Section 5 powers.170  The FMLA requires, among other 
things, that employers allow employees of either sex up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave at the 
birth or adoption of a child or to care for a seriously ill family member.
171
  Rather than 
characterize this as an entitlement program, which is subject to only rational-basis review, the 
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Court characterized the family care leave provision of the FMLA as remedying discrimination on 
the basis of sex.
172
  Allegations of sex discrimination receive heightened scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
173
  Because widespread discrimination on the basis of sex had been 
recognized by the Court in so many cases and the remedy Congress chose to enforce the leave 
provisions was fairly close to what the Fourteenth Amendment would require for voluntary 
employer-leave policies, the Court upheld the FMLA as valid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
174
  
 
The Court shifted its tactics a little by using an as-applied analysis in Tennessee v. 
Lane.
175
 In that case, the Court upheld Title II of the ADA, which requires government bodies to 
provide access to government buildings and services to those with disabilities.
176
 The Court 
found the legislation validly abrogated state sovereign immunity, at least as far as it mandated 
access to courthouses and other functions of government, which is protected under the First 
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances and to participate in the 
political process.
177
 Then in two bankruptcy cases, Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 
and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court held that Congress could subject the 
state to suit in bankruptcy proceedings under its Article I bankruptcy powers.
178
 
 
The Court's as-applied approach cut the other way in the Court's most recent Eleventh 
Amendment case, Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland.
179
 Coleman involved a state 
employee whose employment was essentially terminated after he requested leave to care for his 
own serious health condition.
180
 He alleged a violation of the FMLA and sued the state for 
damages.
181
 Although the Court had held in Hibbs that the FMLA was valid under Congress' 
section 5 power,
182
 that case had involved an employee fired for taking leave to care for a family 
member.
183
 The self care provision of the FMLA was not at issue in Hibbs.
184
 Looking only at 
the self care provision, the Court in Coleman held that there was insufficient evidence that the 
self care provision was tied to sex discrimination or any other constitutional violations by states, 
and so it was not within Congress' section 5 power.
185
 Notably, Justice Scalia, in a concurrence, 
would have held that outside of race, Congress' enforcement power is limited to regulating 
conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
186
 Only Justices Ginsburg and Breyer 
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would hold that Congress may validly abrogate state immunity from suit under its Commerce 
Clause powers.
187
 
 
The Court has also taken a restrictive view of federal power in other civil rights contexts: 
habeas corpus jurisdiction
188
 and voting rights cases.
189
 And in a move similar to the one in 
Ricci, the Court avoided deciding whether the Voting Rights Act exceeded Congress' power in 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One. v. Holder, issued just a week before 
Ricci.
190
 Justice Thomas would have held that the statute exceeded Congress' power.
191
 
 
While the Court has not yet analyzed whether disparate impact liability or other 
provisions of Title VII and related laws are consistent with Congress's powers under the Fifth 
Amendment, the lower courts have generally held that they are within Congress' power, usually 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but sometimes under other amendments, as well. For 
example, in Alaska v. EEOC, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, upheld damages actions against state 
employers brought by policymaking employees for discrimination and retalitation because the 
state action would have violated the Fourteenth and First Amendments.
192
 The Seventh Circuit 
held that at least for cases that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress acted validly 
under its Fourteenth Amendment power in extending Title VII liability to the states, in Nanda v. 
Board of Trustees,
193
 and in enacting the Equal Pay Act, in Varner v. Illinois State University.
194
 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in Warren v. Prejean,
195
 upheld the retaliation provisions of Title 
VII as valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, in Maitland v. University of Minnesota,
196
 held 
that the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII were valid, and in Okruhlik v. University of 
Arkansas,
197
 held that the prohibitions on disparate treatment and disparate impact on the basis of 
race and sex were valid. Finally, in In re Employment Discrimination Litigation,
198
 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that providing for damages for disparate impact discrimination is within Congress’ 
powers Under the Fourteenth Amendment.
199
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Not every provision has been upheld, however. The Seventh Circuit, in Holmes v. Marion 
County Office of Family and Children,
200
 held that religious accommodation provisions of Title 
VII were not valid under the Fourteenth Amendment because the accommodation requirement 
was more onerous than that imposed by the First Amendment, and the legislative history of Title 
VII did not reveal widespread discrimination by states on the basis of religion.
201
 
 
 Were the Court to take up the validity of Title VII's disparate impact provision, the 
outcome may well depend on the case. The Court has been approaching these issues in the last 
few cases in a very narrow way, looking only to the statute's validity as applied to the particular 
case before the Court. Thus, where the disparate impact theory is used to get at cases where 
intent is too difficult to prove, but which are really disparate treatment kinds of cases, Justice 
Scalia suggested that disparate impact would be a theory that could shift the burden to an 
employer to disprove that protected class played a role in the decision. It would seem that 
situations in which employment decisions are left to the wholly subjective discretion of a 
supervisor might be the kind of case that this would apply to, but Justice Scalia's outright refusal 
to even consider the issue in Wal-Mart v. Dukes suggests that he is thinking of some other type 
of situation.
202
 The prohibition on disparate treatment does not appear to be in constitutional 
danger. The government acts consistently when it refrains from or prohibits classification on the 
basis of race and sex, at least, and so Congress likely has the power to order private parties to 
refrain from classifying on the basis of race and sex. Moreover, the commerce clause still forms 
a basis to support that prohibition, and unless the Court holds that refraining from discrimination 
is also discrimination, there does not seem to be a way to create a conflict with the equal 
protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. 
 
 As for the form of disparate impact recognized in Griggs, and further codified by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the analysis should be similar to the analysis of Congress's powers 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in the Eleventh Amendment cases. There are a couple of 
differences, though. On the one hand, federalism concerns, which would limit Congress's power 
would not be present because the focus of the law is on private parties, although it applies to 
states as well. On the other hand, the special grant of power to Congress and away from the 
states is not relevant, or at least not relevant in the same way that it was in the Eleventh 
Amendment context. And finally, the Thirteenth Amendment would be an additional source of 
power over private parties. In short, Congress would seem to have more power to create rules to 
govern the conduct of private parties than it has to govern the conduct of states. 
 
 The content of the equal protection norm contained in the Fifth Amendment must be 
informed by the content of that norm in the Reconstruction Amendments. Whatever the original 
content of the Fifth, when the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted, they amended the 
Fifth, just as they amended article III and the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, Congress should 
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have considerably more power to provide for judicial remedies against private parties because 
private parties have fewer constitutional protections from litigation than do states. There is no 
constitutional immunity from suit that private parties have comparable to the immunity from suit 
that states have. 
 
 Congress should be able to create individual rights or rights to judicial remedies under 
any of its enumerated powers so long as those rights are necessary and proper to carry out its 
enumerated powers. It is true that Congress's power is limited by the Fifth Amendment's 
guarantees of due process, which include now an equal protection component, but that 
amendment cannot limit Congress's power to enforce the substantive guarantees of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. To the extent those might conflict, the later adopted amendments 
must control.
203
 Additionally, Congress gets some leeway to decide how best to enforce the 
guarantees of those constitutional provisions. As long as the remedy provided is congruent and 
proportional to a record of injuries, Congress can provide for prophylactic rules that exceed the 
remedies the Court has provided directly under the constitution.
204
 
 
 This legislative record is full of testimony about private employers refusing to hire people 
who were not white, limiting them to the hardest and least prestigious work, paying them less, 
and segregating their workforces.
205
 More was noted in the legislative record leading to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which gave the EEOC the power to enforce Title 
VII.
206
 This record also detailed discrimination on the basis of sex, which was mostly missing 
from the legislative history of Title VII.
207
 Certainly the kind of exploitation of workers that 
these practices represent and the resulting dependency that a permanent racial underclass or a 
permanent sexual underclass would lead to would be the kinds of things the Thirteenth 
Amendment would reach.
208
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  Given the anti-subordination goals of the Thirteenth Amendment, it may actually prohibit 
disparate impact discrimination by itself.
209
 But at the least, that Amendment, which gives 
Congress specific powers of enforcement just like section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
combination with the extensive record of subordination of women and people of color in 
employment, would allow Congress to prohibit disparate impact discrimination in employment 
as a means to put a greater burden on employers to insure against discrimination in their 
employment practices whether carried out by actors fully self-aware of their discriminatory 
purposes or practices that were not necessary for job-related reasons that inadvertently burdened 
members of groups historically subordinated. 
 
IV. THE DANGERS TO DISPARATE IMPACT THAT NONETHELESS REMAIN 
 
 Thus, in line with the Court's analyses of other statutes and Congress's power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the disparate impact provision seems to be within Congress's power 
under it, under the Fifth Amendment as modified by the Fourteenth, and under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Even so, there is still some risk that the Court might not accept this analysis. 
 
Where the Court has upheld statutes that create rights beyond what the Constitution 
would require, it has generally done so at times relatively close to that of the legislation's 
adoption.
210
 And time may matter.
211
 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, for example, the Court 
found that Congress could, in the Voting Rights Act, prohibit conduct the Constitution would 
permit, in part because the Act was limited in time, that provision was limited in geography, and 
the remedy was limited to the most egregious practices.
212
 Decades have passed since Congress 
made a legislative record documenting widespread discrimination. It is possible the Court would 
not see a continuing need for more prophylactic remedies.  
 
And continuing the theme of change with the passage of time since the civil rights era, 
there are a number of additional tensions in the employment discrimination context that only 
seem to grow. It is not clear, for example, how this view of disparate impact as discrimination 
can be reconciled with prior Supreme Court opinions upholding voluntary affirmative action by 
employers as not discrimination.  
 
In the end, much in this area seems to be about framing the issues – a task that is harder 
for supporters of Title VII with the passage of time because even if at one time we had 
consensus, we no longer do on fundamental issues like what discrimination is and what form of 
equality is embodied by the concept of equal protection; whether disparate impact is actually 
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discrimination – or at least discrimination that should be illegal; whether disparate impact is a 
form of affirmative action or a guard against disparate treatment; whether affirmative action is  
insurance against discrimination, a remedy for past discrimination, or a remedy for social 
discrimination; and whether there is a tension between group-based harms and individual harms 
and if so, how to balance that tension. 
 
. . . 
 
When the Court first issued its decision, the reaction of scholars and practitioners in the 
area was somewhat unusual. Often, people in this area divide along client-focused lines into a 
labor side and a management side. The Ricci case presented an unusual convergence of interests 
because the employer here sided with the usually disadvantaged group of employees. So most of 
those who are usually labor side advocates had aligned with management side advocates in 
urging the Court to affirm the lower court’s decision. When the decision was issued, both labor 
and management advocates bemoaned the result.
213
 The split in opinion on this case was along a 
different fault line: strict legal formalists and everybody else. 
 
 Based on the Court’s recent decisions in the context of higher education, particularly 
Justice Roberts’ statement that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race” in a recent voluntary desegregation case,214 the resort to 
formalism in the employment discrimination context should not have been surprising. And yet 
for many scholars at least, it was, primarily because most of us did not think of the City’s actions 
as being caused by the races of the test takers who had done well. And disparate treatment law 
generally requires that an actor act “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ . . . adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group” to be considered to have a discriminatory purpose.215 
 
We may have come to expect the use of a color-blind or strictly formalist approach when 
a government considers race as a factor in the promotional process, so that even though that 
approach has not been imported into Title VII, its importation would not have been surprising. 
But, this was not a traditional affirmative action case, where the employer explicitly uses race as 
a criteria for hiring or promotion. In fact, if you believe the City’s defense that it had a good faith 
belief that the test caused a disparate impact, a contention that the Court accepted, the race of the 
successful test takers was considered only as a point of comparison to the race of the 
unsuccessful test takers. To get to the conclusion that the majority reached, then, required several 
steps, none of which was a foregone conclusion. 
 
If we accept the City’s contention about its motivation, its thought process would have 
looked like this: 1. City leaders know the results of the exams and the breakdown of candidates 
by race; 2. City leaders deduce that the black and Hispanic applicants passed at a rate of half or 
less than the rate at which white applicants passed and that they are ranked respectively lower; 3. 
City leaders are concerned that the results are not likely to have occurred by chance and so are 
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concerned that the process at least looks like it has caused a disparate racial impact; 4. the City 
leaders know they will be sued if the process has caused a disparate racial impact or even looks 
like it has; 5. the City decides not to use the results of the process based on a desire not to get 
sued for the disparate racial impact.  
 
The last step, to infer that a desire not to get sued for a disparate racial impact action is by 
definition a desire to use race as the single criterion for acting is a bit of a stretch. To conclude 
that the results of the process were discarded because of race of the plaintiffs, the majority had to 
equate the desire not to discriminate against two groups (or at least not to get sued for 
discrimination) with a desire to discriminate against another group. In other words, that 
knowledge of the races of individuals or race consciousness automatically equated with race 
discrimination. As a normative matter, this premise is troubling. To say that concern over the 
possibility of a discriminatory effect is itself a discriminatory motive seems to create a terrible 
theory of discrimination, a moral equivalence that automatically pits groups against one another 
in zero-sum fashion in competition for jobs.  
 
We have come a long way in the more than forty years since Title VII was enacted. Race 
is becoming less salient with every new generation of workers. A decision by the Court equating 
Title VII compliance efforts with discrimination is likely to reverse that trend. And if that trend 
is reversed, not only do we freeze our progress toward racial justice where we are, or perhaps 
move backwards, but we also make race something always to be contested, a zero-sum game, 
with every promotion given to a person of color an injury to a white person. Suggesting that 
white people are injured when an employer decides not to act out of concern that the action 
would discriminate reinforces the notion that white people have some sort of greater entitlement 
to jobs or promotions than do people of color.
216
 It creates an incentive for white people to resist 
employer compliance with Title VII, and it creates an incentive for white people to resist social 
advancement of people of color in other settings as well. Such an incentive would take racial 
politics back to the 1960s or before.
217
  
 
The Court’s decision thus represents implicit rejection of the basis for the Court's early 
decisions on Title VII, that discrimination in employment was common, that absent some other 
good explanation for an adverse action, discrimination was a reasonable explanation for it, and 
that without incentives, employers would not look critically at what was really required to 
perform a job and whether this individual could do that. Instead, they could rely on old proxies 
for fitness without examining them critically. Now it seems that the Court is concluding that 
discrimination against people of color is rare and assertions of discrimination are suspect, and 
that the continued lack of attainment by people of color is because of limitations in those people, 
not obstacles in the system.  And that worldview likely really drove the decision. Much of the 
Court’s discussion shows a number of such background assumptions: that written tests are valid 
predictors of merit regardless of the type of job, at least when designed by testing experts; that 
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efforts to make a test race neutral are more important than the effects of the test; and when 
distinctions based on race are made, white people are injured.
218
  
 
This latter point is especially interesting in this case, because it demonstrates perhaps the 
biggest weakness in the majority’s approach, at least from a conservative viewpoint – that it was 
not color blind or formalist at all. The Court’s usual formalist approach looks first to the explicit 
distinctions an employer makes. If the employer does not make a distinction explicitly using a 
protected status, then the distinction will not be “because of” that protected status at first glance. 
A plaintiff may prove that the non-protected-class criterion was actually used as a proxy to target 
people in the protected class, but usually that criterion has to line up perfectly with the protected 
class.
219
 And so discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, itself not gender per se, was not 
discrimination on the basis of sex because even though only women could be pregnant, the non-
pregnant category included both men and women.
220
 Here, the City’s explanation that it feared a 
disparate impact suit was not race per se. Moreover, applicants who would have been promoted 
had the list been used included applicants from all backgrounds, and the pool of those who 
would get a second chance at promotion if the list were discarded also included members from 
all backgrounds. There was no strict formal separation on the basis of race. 
 
  The Court’s decision also presents a number of other doctrinal problems. Before this 
decision, the employer’s reason and whether that proffered reason was a pretext for 
discrimination were viewed as subjective matters. The question was not whether the employer’s 
reason was correct as an absolute matter, but whether the employer honestly believed in the truth 
of the reason.
221
 While the Court insisted that it was not dealing with the subjective motivation of 
the City, its opinion reveals some significant sleight of hand, essentially getting to the subjective 
issue without admitting it. By focusing on the amount of evidence that the City had before it and 
requiring such evidence to be “substantial,” the Court implicitly suggested that it did not believe 
that the City was actually motivated by a fear of disparate impact liability. Why else discuss how 
easy it would be for an unscrupulous employer to use the fear of litigation as a pretext for 
making decisions based on race alone?
222
 If the Court were really concerned that the claim would 
be easy to use as a pretext, it could have analyzed the case as involving pretext instead of trying 
to expand the definition of discrimination. Alternatively, the Court could have suggested that the 
appropriate analytical tool was to analyze the City’s actions as causing a disparate impact on the 
white firefighters. Both of these are strategies used when neutral appearing reasons are actually 
covers for intentional use of a protected status as a qualification. 
 
If the Court had been consistent with prior cases and treated the issue as a question of 
pretext, though, it would not have been able to enter summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The 
only question that would have remained was whether the defendants honestly believed that the 
process might cause an illegal disparate impact sufficient to provoke litigation and whether they 
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wanted to avoid that result, or instead whether the defendants desired to deny promotions to the 
plaintiffs because they (or at least the majority of them) were white. In other words, the question 
would be whether the defendants used race or a race linked criterion as a proxy for fitness for 
promotion. That is a factual question. If we take the majority’s acceptance of the City’s reason or 
Justice Ginsburg’s view of the facts, the Court would have had to affirm the grant of summary 
judgment. There was simply no evidence that the City decision makers acted because the most 
successful candidates were white, and they did not want white firefighters to get promoted. And 
even if we take Justice Alito’s view of the facts, reaching that question would have still have 
required the Court to remand the case to the district court for trial on the issue of pretext. Justice 
Alito emphasized that a reasonable jury could find that the fear of a disparate impact suit was 
simply a pretext for placating a vocal racial constituency; he does not say that he would have 
held as a matter of fact that this was the City’s actual motivation.223 
 
Other doctrinal problems created by the case relate to the series of inferences the Court 
had to have made to conclude that the City was motivated to not use the list because of the race 
of the successful candidates. First, the Court makes something of a leap between knowledge of 
the races of the applicants and a desire to act because of race alone. The Court may have made it 
easier for plaintiffs to prove discrimination. A plaintiff may be able to prove disparate treatment 
by proving that the defendant knew the plaintiff’s protected status and made an adverse 
employment action injuring that plaintiff, because making a decision in light of that knowledge 
made the decision “because of” the protected status.224 Similarly, it is possible that the Court has 
recognized some kind of transferred intent that benefits anyone injured by an adverse 
employment action that was motivated by race, regardless of whether the race of the plaintiff was 
what motivated the employer.
225
 And so, for example, the black and Hispanic firefighters who 
would have been eligible for a promotion apparently have a cause of action for disparate 
treatment in this case because the city was motivated in the Court’s view by the race of the white 
firefighters. Similarly, if the city had decided not to use the list because some black or Hispanic 
firefighters might be eligible for promotion, and they did not want to promote anyone of those 
races, all of the white firefighters would also have a cause of action for failure to promote. 
  
An additional doctrinal problem is posed by the fact that the City at least said it was 
trying to voluntarily comply with Title VII. The goal of Title VII is to eradicate discrimination, 
to change the social norms so that people no longer engage in acts that discriminate on the basis 
of race, in other words, to avoid the harm of discrimination.
226
 As a part of that effort, this Court 
has recognized that employers must be given incentives to voluntarily comply with the statute.
227
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To say that an action taken to avoid discriminating is itself discrimination may make such 
voluntary compliance efforts incredibly more difficult if not impossible. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 As the doctrinal problems described above show, the Court's decision in Ricci raises 
more questions than it answers about where the law against employment discrimination is 
headed in the future. Taken in the context of other recent cases, the Supreme Court's decisions 
seem to be viewing the issue of discrimination in ever more simplistic terms, and the majority of 
Justices seem to be viewing individual claims of discrimination by groups historically 
discriminated against with increasing skepticism. Whether or not American society is truly post-
race or post-sex, it seems that the majority of Supreme Court Justices are. 
 
It is not only their view of sex and race relations that seems narrow, however. At least a 
sizeable minority of the Justices seem to view government power, at least in some contexts, in 
very narrow terms. The majority of Justices essentially held in Ricci that there were limits on the 
way private employers can act as they scrutinize their employment practices to root out barriers 
to equal opportunity. More importantly, the Court viewed that mandate to scrutinize employment 
practices with substantial disdain. It may not be that large a step to Justice Scalia's suggestion 
that Congress is limited in how it can address discrimination. Thus, Justice Scalia's concern 
about Congress's power to prohibit discriminatory effects in the private sector is just one 
example of the many dangers faced by our laws against employment discrimination. 
